Abstract: We examine the valuation effect of a bank's insolvency on related industrial firms. Our sample includes 29 insolvent banks in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand that serve as main creditors for 269 publicly traded companies. Our findings suggest that a bank relationship adds value to a firm, and that investor confidence in bank-related firms depends on investor's certainty in the continuity of the banking relationship. Announcement of a bank closure, preceding liquidation and resulting in a complete loss of ties with the main creditor, leads to discounts in the market value of related firms. Announcement of a nationalization, preceding recapitalization and new management, is associated with short-and long-term premiums in the market value of related firms. Announcement of a foreign sale is associated with initial value discounts, but longer-term market premiums as investors revise their expectations of the effect of foreign capital and expertise. The announcement of a domestic merger, which continues the banking relationship but adds neither capital nor new management, has a significantly positive short-term effect on the market value of related firms, but no long-term effect. Significant cumulative returns for fifty days following our event date suggest that investors correctly expect changes in bank ownership to have real effects on the performance of related firms. We also explore but do not find support for alternative explanations of our results.
The recent financial crisis in East Asia offers a unique opportunity to study the value of connected bank lending. In the United States, the Glass-Steagal Banking Act prohibited banks from owning equity in commercial firms and thus largely eliminated the possibility of connected lending. In East Asia, however, banks are linked to commercial firms through direct ownership, indirect pyramidal control, or long-standing main-bank relationships. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that East Asian countries epitomize strong bank lending relationships. Consequently, the numerous bank failures in East Asia in 1998 and 1999, following the crisis, allow us to study the effect of bank insolvency on the market value of bank-related firms.
Bank insolvency in East Asia also presents an opportunity to compare the effects of different types of resolutions of financial distress. In our sample of distressed banks, bank supervisors announced one of the following four actions: closure, foreign sale, domestic merger, or nationalization. In the case of closure, the assets of the bank are prepared for liquidation and the bank relationship ends. In the case of nationalization, the bank is recapitalized and the lending-relationship may continue. In the case of a foreign sale, however, the bank is recapitalized, but the current management is replaced, and the continuation of the lending-relationship is uncertain. In addition, governments forced domestic mergers between domestic banks, which may have reduced the amount of nonperforming loans but changed corporate governance.
As a result, we can use the type of resolution of financial distress to explicitly identify the change in the borrower-lender relationship, and test the effect of a change in the lending relationship on the valuation of a related firm. Since each type of resolution of a bank's financial distress results in a particular change in the borrower-lender relationship, we expect changes in the lending relationship to result in differences in the value of the stocks of related firms.
In previous literature, Slovin et al. (1993) examine the share price reactions of firms in the U.S. with lending relationships with Continental Illinois Bank during its period of insolvency and the subsequent FDIC bailout. They find that Continental Illinois's failure had a negative effect on their U.S. corporate clients' share prices.
However, the U.S. has since implemented a "too big to fail" policy, which has prevented large bank closures. The scarcity of large bank failures and the absence of strong ties between banks and corporations in most market-oriented economies have hindered additional studies evaluating the market effect of bank relationships.
Our paper focuses on Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, the three East Asian countries most adversely affected by the recent crisis. We extend Slovin, et al. (1993) in a number of ways. First, we collect data for 29 banks whose insolvency was announced in 1998 and 1999 and who acted as main creditors for 269 publicly traded companies.
Second, we examine in more detail the effect of announced resolutions of financial distress and discuss the market-perceived differences in the future of the lending relationships.
We use daily close prices to estimate the abnormal stock returns for bank-related firms following the announcement of the related bank's insolvency. Our findings suggest that investor confidence in bank-related firms depends on the investors' confidence in the continuity of management at the insolvent banks. Announcement of a bank closure, preceding liquidation and resulting in a complete loss of ties with the main creditor, leads to value discounts in the market value of related firms. Announcement of a nationalization, preceding recapitalization and new management, is associated with shortand long-term premiums in the market value of related firms. Announcement of a foreign sale is associated with initial value discounts, but longer-term market premiums as investors revise their expectations of the effect of foreign capital and expertise. The announcement of a domestic merger, which continues the banking relationship but adds neither capital nor new management, has a significantly positive short-term effect on the market value of related firms, but no long-term effect. Significant cumulative returns for fifty days following our event date suggest that investors correctly expect changes in bank ownership to have real effects on the performance of related firms. We also explore but do not find support for alternative explanations of our results.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1, we discuss the background for our hypothesis and review related empirical literature. In Section 2, we describe our data sources and event study methodology. In Section 3, we report our empirical findings. In Section 4, we conclude.
Background and Literature Review

A. The Effect of Bank Relationships on Firm Value
The modern theory of banking emphasizes the importance of banks as producers of information who use their information to design tailored contracts for informationally opaque borrowers. For example, Fama (1985) , Rajan (1992) , and Diamond (1991) present theoretical support for the contention that relationship lending generates valuable information about borrower quality and encourages financial intermediaries to invest in the information costs for credit-constrained firms. In addition, Cole (1998) finds empirical evidence that a lender is more likely to extend credit to a firm with which it has a pre-existing relationship. Since banks have a comparative advantage in gathering private information about firms with which they have ongoing relationships, they are able to offer these borrowers more credit at lower costs.
In previous empirical literature, James (1987) , Billett et al. (1995), and Lummer and McConnell (1989) find that announcements of new bank loans and loan renewal agreements cause significantly positive average excess stock returns. This suggests that financial intermediaries have a unique advantage in producing information, and that the expected production of information by a financial intermediary adds value to even large, publicly traded, informationally transparent firms. In particular, the announcement of a new loan signals that the bank has ex-ante collected information about the quality and future performance of the firm. Furthermore, the announcement of a loan renewal reflects ex-post monitoring and confidence by the bank in the borrower and projects related to the financing.
However, related literature suggests that banking relationships might have a dark side. For example, Kang and Stulz (1998) find that from 1990 to 1993, bank-dependent Japanese firms had significantly lower investments when their related bank experienced financial distress. They also find that exogenous bank shocks caused by the Basle Accord negotiations significantly affected the market price of bank-related firms. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) find that although firms with a bank-relationship invest more capital, they do so at a higher cost. They suggest that any gains from a bank-relationship are offset by the rent paid in the form of higher costs of capital from their related bank. In addition, Pinkowitz and Williamson (1998) examine the cash holdings of firms in Japan, Germany, and United States. They conclude that Japanese banks, which operate in a bank-centered governance system that lacks other outside monitors, extract rents from firms by forcing them to have excessive bank debt and to hold large amounts of capital in cash.
These findings, however, focus on the direct costs of bank-relatedness. Other studies, such as Hoshi, et al (1990a) , find that a bank relationship improves a firm's access to capital and promotes corporate investment in a sample of Japanese firms. In addition, Hoshi, et al. (1990b) show that bank-affiliated firms can more easily renegotiate their terms of credit to reduce the costs of financial distress. Consequently, bank-related firms recover more quickly from financial distress than other firms, and without necessarily using formal reorganization or bankruptcy procedures. Claessens, et al. (1999a) , and Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that although bank-related firms pay higher costs during good times, they recover quicker and are less likely to enter bankruptcy during bad times. These results suggest that a bank-relationship may have intangible value to the firm, which would increase the firm's valuation.
In a related study, Slovin et al. (1993) find that the announcement of insolvency of Continental Illinois Bank had a negative effect on their client firms' share prices. In addition, they find that the announcement of the FDIC bailout had a positive effect on their client firms' share prices. This suggests that although an announcement of bank insolvency causes a fall in the stock price of client firms, low valuations will continue only if the resolution of the financial distress of the bank is closure. Therefore, a bailout plan resulting in the possibility of the continuation of the lending relationship should boost stock prices.
B. The East Asian Financial Crisis
The East Asian crisis began in Thailand in mid-1997, when an ailing financial sector, an export slowdown, and large increases in central bank credit to weak financial institutions triggered a run on the baht. The crisis quickly spread to Indonesia and Korea, as common vulnerabilities and changes in international sentiment resulted in large capital outflows. East Asian governments were initially slow to address growing distress in the banking sector. At first, the governments tried to keep insolvent institutions afloat by injecting liquidity. This strategy, however, incurred large (and unpopular) fiscal costs.
The governments' delayed and sometimes partial responses to the crisis caused financial turbulence and runs on financial institutions. The governments responded to the crisis in public confidence (in Indonesia and Thailand) and foreign currency outflows (in Korea) by issuing unlimited guarantees on their financial systems' liabilities. These guarantees stemmed the confidence crisis, but weakened governments' need to act comprehensively.
As shown in Table 1 , responses and progress on financial restructuring have varied considerably across the three crisis countries. Korea has moved aggressively to strengthen its banking system through recapitalizations, nationalizations, removal of bad debt, and mergers. Although Korean officials have closed over a hundred non-bank financial institutions, no banks have been shutdown. Instead, eleven banks were merged with other domestic banks and four banks were nationalized. Thailand adopted a market-based approach, allowing banks to raise capital over a longer time period. The Thai authorities closed down two-thirds of the finance companies' sector but allowed banks a transitional period to raise capital through phasedin tighter loan provisioning requirements. At the same time, the government offered to inject tier-1 capital, subject to the condition that any bank accepting public money would have to satisfy certain stringent conditions, for example, meeting strict loan loss provisioning and making management changes. As a result, the Thai government was only required to shutdown one bank. In addition, three banks were merged with other domestic banks and four banks were nationalized.
Of the three crisis countries, Indonesia has made the least progress in reforming its banking sector. By March 1999, sixty-four small banks were closed down, twelve banks were nationalized, and nine of the large banks were re-capitalized. However, most financial institutions remained severely insolvent or undercapitalized. In response, the government guaranteed deposits of all Indonesian banks and nominated the Central Bank to act as a paying agent for depositors of the closed banks.
In addition, all three-crisis countries reformed existing bank regulations to permit foreign banks to purchase domestic banks. The expected benefits of this measure are to infuse foreign capital and bring banking expertise. For example, Moody's "Banking System Outlook: Korea" (1998) states: "Foreign Acquisition is the option of choice for the government because it will bring in badly needed foreign capital, thus reducing the burden on the public sector, while providing technical expertise and enhancing the quality of management. In Moody's view, improving management quality that is free from political influence is an especially critical aspect of the banking sector reform." As of October 1999, Indonesia has 1 foreign bank purchase pending, Korea has 2 foreign bank purchases completed and 1 pending, and Thailand has 2 foreign bank purchases completed and 4 pending.
Data and Methodology
A. Identifying Bank Insolvency, Resolutions, and Related Commercial Firms
We collect announcements by bank supervisors of insolvency and the resolution of bank distress from Sequencer News Retrieval published by the Financial Times. Table   2 shows a list of banks, event dates, and resolutions of financial distress, for banks that had lent to publicly traded commercial firms. To determine lending relations, we identify non-financial firms with a main-bank relationship with a commercial bank. This data is reported by the respective Security and Exchange Commissions in the "Company Handbooks", which list for each publicly traded firm the name of its related bank(s). Since banking relationships may have changed during and following the crisis, we obtained on-request the most recently available information directly from the respective Commissions.
In addition, for firms in Korea and Indonesia, the names of all related banks are listed if a company has more than one banking relationship. Although we are unable to determine the relative importance of each bank, (since there is no information of the size of individual loans), we can identify companies that have multiple bank relationships.
This information is used to control for the dependence of the borrower on the related insolvent bank.
Interestingly, the data for Korea shows little evidence of multiple bank relationships. One explanation may be that most large firms belong to business groups known as chaebol, which have close relationships with a particular bank. Alternatively, the data may imply that Korean firms borrowed from foreign banks through their intermediaries abroad, since foreign entry was prohibited in the Korean banking sector prior to 1998. Since we are unable to identify foreign bank relationships, we may incorrectly classify firms in Korea as having a single-bank relationship. Therefore, in the robustness analysis we identify a multiple-bank relationship dummy only for Indonesia.
To calculate abnormal returns, we use daily close price data from DataStream, and market indices from the International Finance Corporation's Emerging Markets Database.
B. Event Study Methodology
To calculate abnormal returns, we use the day of the announcement of a bank insolvency as the event date, t=0. For announcements on Saturday or Sunday (when the markets are closed) and on stock exchange holidays, we use the next available trading day as the event date, t=0.
2 We hold as our null hypothesis that the market revalues a firm on the announcement of financial distress of the firm's related bank, contingent on the probability of the loss of its banking relationship.
In estimating cumulative average returns, we encounter the potential problem of correlation between returns of individual firms. This correlation can arise spuriously due to clustering of event dates for a particular group of bank related firms. This correlation could cause us to overstate the significance levels of average abnormal returns when aggregating individual firm's returns into portfolios. To control for this potential concern of cross-sectional correlation in returns, we create bank portfolios of related commercial firms and estimate abnormal returns for each individual portfolio. First, for each observed bank announcement date we create daily returns of a portfolio of related firms. Second, for each bank portfolio of commercial firms, we calculate abnormal market returns for date t=0.
To estimate abnormal returns, we follow the methodology in Dodd and Warner (1983) , and define each day's abnormal return (AR) as:
Where R jt is the daily stock price return of firm j for the day t and Market t is the daily return of the IFC country stock price index. The parameters α j and β j are the market model parameters estimated from the regression using daily trading data for the window t= -259 to -60 days prior to the announcement date.
The cumulative abnormal return, CAR t1,t2 , is the measure of abnormal performance of bank-portfolio j between the two dates t=t1 to t2. To calculate mean standardized CAR's, each bank-portfolio-level CAR is standardized by its estimated standard error. The bank-portfolio-level standardized CAR's are assumed to be distributed unit normal in the absence of abnormal performance.
Sample and Empirical Findings
A. Sample Table 3 summarizes the type of resolution of financial distress, by country. Four banks in our sample have two announcements, which affects 178 of the 269 related firms.
The sample includes announcements in three emerging East Asian countries: 11 in Indonesia, 11 in Korea, and 10 in Thailand. There are a total of 447 firm-events in our sample. The sample includes four types of bank distress workouts: 52 firms are related to banks that were closed, 209 firms are related to banks that were offered for sale to foreigners, 92 firms are related to banks that were merged with other domestic banks, and 94 firms are related to banks that were nationalized.
B. Effect of the Type of Resolution of Financial Distress
We proceed with event study tests that measure the market perceived effect of bank insolvency on bank-related firms' future expected growth. Table 4 reports the average stock price response to the announcement of a bank restructuring. Around the event date, CAR(-1,0), we find a significantly negative mean abnormal return associated with announcements of bank closures, and a significantly positive mean abnormal return associated with announcements of bank nationalizations and foreign sales. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the market responds unfavorably to the announcement of the discontinuation of a lending relationship.
The largest economic effects are found for announcements of nationalizations and closures, whose effect on the extension of the banking relationship are known with relative certainty. The affect of these announcements is greater then 3%, suggesting that the market rewards an announced continuation of a banking relationship while discounting a loss. In contrast, the announcement by the government of the sale or merger of distressed banks to (non-governmental) third parties has economically small or insignificant effects. In the cases that the government announced its unprecedented intention to sell distressed banks to foreigners or to force a merger between domestic banks, the market had no immediate information on how involved the acquiring bank will be in the management and decision making of the related bank.
We show the results for CAR(-10,-2) to demonstrate that our results are not distorted by news leakage prior to the event date. An exception, however, is for the announcement of domestic mergers. Since this decision cannot be made by the government unilaterally, but requires the consent and participation of domestic banks, it is expected that this information would leak to market participants. Since domestic mergers allow for the continuation of banking relationships, the significantly positive CAR is consistent with our hypothesis.
In addition to the effect of announcements on firm valuations, we also explore the long-term real effect of changes in bank ownership on related firms. We find large and significant cumulative abnormal return for 50 days after the announcements of foreign sales and nationalizations (CAR(1,50)). We assume that this longer window captures at least one attempted roll-over of short-term debt, which often has the maturity of twomonths (45 business days). It is not surprising that domestic mergers, which offer neither new capital nor management, do not have a long-term effect on expected firm performance. In addition, the insignificant CAR for firms whose banks were subject to closure may imply that related firms were successful in establishing new lending relationships and refinancing their short-term debt, although expected future performance remains unchanged.
Over this longer horizon, the significantly positive CAR for nationalizations suggests that the market continues to value the recapitalization of related lenders. In addition, during this period governments may have begun to bring in outsiders to manage the failed bank accounts properly. Investors appear to value the future contribution of outside expertise and increased scrutiny of loan decisions. Similarly, the significantly positive CAR for foreign sales suggests that investors strongly reverse their initial reactions to the announced sale of the related bank to foreigners. As potential foreign bids materialized for these banks, investors may have revised upwards their expectations of the effect of foreign bank governance and expertise on the debt management of related firms.
C. Multivariate Regressions Analysis
The results of a multivariate analysis are shown in Table 5 . We use the firm-level CAR's from a two-day event window, t=-1 to 0, using weighted least squares. The standard errors of the estimation period (date t=-259 to -60) residuals are used as the weighting factors. To test the significance of the resolution of financial distress, we use dummies to identify nationalizations, closures, foreign sales, and domestic mergers.
In Korea, we find abnormal returns associated with announcements of nationalization are significantly positive, returns associated with domestic mergers are significantly negative, and returns associated with foreign sales are insignificant. Since there is no precedent for the effect of foreign ownership on local industrial firms, we expect the coefficient for foreign sales to be insignificant. In Thailand, we find significant returns associated only with nationalizations.
significantly positive returns. These results are consistent with our univariate regressions that investors revalue expected firm values in response to changes in banking relationships. However, it can be argued that our results have alternative explanations, which are explored in the next two sections.
D. Alternative Hypothesis: Family-Association Effect
A possible alternative explanation of our results is the "family-effects"
hypothesis. This posits that bank intervention/insolvency announcements are a signal of the financial health of the firms' families, not the banking relationship, per se. First, however, corporate ownership restrictions in East Asia refute the stronger hypothesis that our results reflect direct equity subsidies and losses. In Korea, for example, banks are permitted to hold only 5% of the total equity in commercial firms. In addition, before 1998, commercial firms in Korea and Thailand were legally prohibited from owning equity in commercial banks. Therefore, in Korea and Thailand we can ascertain that the stock price response to the announcement of an insolvency of a related bank was not caused by an expected fall in value of bank equity held by the related firm.
Secondly, for the 'family effect' hypothesis to make sense, we should observe unique bank-family associations. That is, (i) all firms within one family should be associated with the same bank, and (ii) a particular bank should lend only to one family group. Table A .2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of family groups across banking relationships. These results reject the alternative hypothesis, since we observe multiple banking relationships for firms within one family. The banks also appear to lend to firms associated with various families. Consider, for example, Bank Danamon in Indonesia, which has lending relationships with six firms, five of which are associated with five unique families and one independent of a family group. This bank-family mix would suggest that bank insolvency could not really be explained as a weakness of an associated family.
In addition, a literal implication of the family-effect hypothesis is that any announcement of a bank work-out should negatively affect related firms, regardless of the type of resolution. This assertion is most clearly disproved by our previous evidence in Table 3 , where we show that nationalizations have a large, significantly positive effect on the value of related firms.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is inconsistent with a familyassociation effect. Our results suggest that a market response to related firms is not a signal of a family's weakening financial health but, rather, a measure of the value of a bank relationship to an individual industrial firm.
E. Alternative Hypothesis: Credit-Crunch Effect
Since the three countries in our sample experienced severe financial crisis, the value of banking relationships may be overstated. During a systemic financial crisis, system-wide bank reductions in the supply of loans may cause what has been called a "credit-crunch" effect. If the firms in our sample are unable to access other sources of credit, at any cost, then the value of their banking relationships may be exaggerated.
An implication of the credit-crunch effect is a disproportionate decrease in supply of capital available to industrial firms relative to their demand for funds. In previous literature, such as Dwor-Frecaut, et al. (1999) and Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) , we find evidence that this has not been the case for the East Asian countries affected by the crisis.
They show that while the supply of loans fell during the crisis, the constraining factor was the demand for credit.
Nevertheless, to test the credit-crunch hypothesis we include a dummy identifying multiple banking relationships for the sample of firms in Indonesia. 4 The results are reported in Table 5 (column 2). The insignificance of the multiple bank dummy variable and the continued significance of the closure dummy suggests that our results hold even for firms with additional sources of financing. Consequently, the results presented in section 3.B are not likely to be significantly overstated because of a credit-crunch.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate what happens to firms whose bank becomes financially distressed. This experimental design allows us to gauge the value of a bank relationship. The evidence in previous literature suggests that there is a cost to firms in exchange for the benefits of having a bank relationship. Missing from the literature, however, is conclusive evidence on the value of a banking relationship. Our findings suggest that a bank relationship adds value to a firm, and that investor confidence in bank-related firms depends on investor's certainty in the continuity of the banking relationship.
Announcement of a bank closure, preceding liquidation and resulting in a complete loss of ties with the main creditor, leads to value discounts in the market value of related firms. Announcement of a nationalization, preceding recapitalization and new management, is associated with short-and long-term premiums in the market value of related firms. Announcement of a foreign sale is associated with initial value discounts, but longer-term market premiums as investors revise their expectations of the effect of foreign capital and expertise. The announcement of a domestic merger, which continues the banking relationship but adds neither capital nor new management, has a significantly positive short-term effect on the market value of related firms, but no long-term effect.
Significant cumulative returns for fifty days following our event date suggest that investors correctly expect changes in bank ownership to have real effects on the performance of related firms. We also explore and do not find support for alternative explanations of our results. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for time period t = -1 to 0, where the event date t = 0 is the date of the announcement of the type of resolution of distress of the firm's related bank. The regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, with the standard errors of the estimation period (date t = -259 to -60) residuals used as the weighting factors. CLOSURE is a dummy indicating that the related bank would be closed, FORSAL is a dummy indicating that the related bank would be sold to foreigners, DOMMER is a dummy indicating that the related bank would be merged domestically, and NAT is a dummy indicating that the related bank would be nationalized. FAMILY-DUM is a dummy indicating that the related firm belongs to a family group. MULTBANK-DUM is a dummy indicating that the related firm has multiple banking relationships. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
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